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Abstract
In a winner-take-all duopoly market for systems in which firms invest to improve
their products, a monopoly supplier of an essential system component may have
an incentive to advantage itself by technological tying; that is, by designing the
component to work better in its own system. If the vertically integrated firm is
prevented from technologically tying, then there is a pure strategy equilibrium
in which the more eﬃcient firm invests and serves the entire market. However
other equilibria may exist, including a pure strategy equilibrium in which the
less eﬃcient firm invests and captures the market and mixed strategy equilibria
in which each firm captures the market with positive probability. In contrast, if
the vertically integrated firm is able to degrade the quality of its rival’s system
with a technological tie, and if the wholesale price of the essential component is
insuﬃciently remunerative, then there is a unique equilibrium outcome in which
the supplier of the essential component invests alone and forecloses a more eﬃ-
cient rival with an actual, or merely threatened, technological tie. A comparison
of these equilibria for the two game forms demonstrates that a prohibition of
technological tying can either increase or decrease social welfare depending on
equilibrium selection.
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1 Introduction
During the “browser war” between Microsoft and Netscape, Microsoft and its defenders
argued that its Internet Explorer browser gained market acceptance because it was a su-
perior product (see e.g., Liebowitz and Margolis, 1999). Microsoft’s critics responded that
Internet Explorer benefited from Microsoft’s exclusionary practices associated with the dis-
tribution and use of its ubiquitous Windows operating system. In this paper we examine
strategic competition in markets for systems that combine one or more component inputs to
produce a final output, when of the components is controlled by a monopoly. Examples of
such markets can be found in telecommunications, electricity service, and other industries
in addition to information technologies. In these markets a single supplier often controls
an essential component of the system such as an operating system, a local telephone ex-
change network, or an electricity transmission grid. We examine competition under the
assumption that the firm that supplies the system with the lowest quality-adjusted price
wins the entire market. When system suppliers have unfettered access to the essential
component, a firm can prevail by investing to improve the quality of its system. We show
that even on this level playing firm, the firm that is the most eﬃcient supplier of systems
need not emerge as the market leader. We also consider the incentives of the monopolist to
tip the scales of competition by granting itself superior technological access to the essential
component. This could be accomplished by designing the essential component to work
better with its own system, thereby degrading the performance of rival systems relative to
its own. Such a “technological tie” can give the monopoly component supplier a greater
incentive to innovate and is an additional reason why the market structure ex post need not
reflect the most capable supplier of systems ex ante.2
The monopolist confronts a trade-oﬀ in considering the merits of a technological tie. On
the one hand, by limiting rivals’ access to an essential component, the monopolist profits
by curtailing competition in the market for systems. On the other hand, the technological
tie reduces the monopolist’s ability to extract rents from more eﬃcient rivals through sales
of the essential component. If rivals have a superior ability to innovate, or produce systems
that appeal to a large number of consumers, then by providing access the monopolist profits
from sales of the component. The technological tying trade-oﬀ depends on the price of the
component. A high component price encourages the monopolist to provide eﬃcient access to
the essential component, while a low price encourages the monopolist to limit access with a
technological tie. Therefore technological tying is likely to be an attractive business strategy
for the monopolist only if sales of the upstream component are insuﬃciently remunerative.
The traditional “Chicago School” emphasizes that there is no incentive for technological
tying (other than for eﬃciency reasons) if a monopoly profit for the tying product can
be extracted by charging a profit-maximizing price.3 There are reasons, however, why a
2A technological tie refers to the physical integration of a product with another product, in a manner that
makes it costly for rivals to sell similar integrated products. A technological tie may also be accomplished by
designing an interface or withholding technical information to impede the interoperability of a complementary
product. See Lessig (2000) for a review of the case law on tying and its applicability to U.S. v. Microsoft.
3Bowman (1957) and Bork (1978), among others, maintain that the owner of an essential input that is
used in fixed proportions with another competitively supplied good has no incentive to bundle the input
and the complementary good or to tie purchase of the complementary good to the essential input. The
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monopolist may have limited flexibility to charge rivals a profit-maximizing price for an
essential component. One possibility is that the component has other uses that consumers
value diﬀerently. The monopolist may opt for a mixed bundling strategy, selling both
systems and the component on a stand-alone basis, while imposing a technological tie to
prevent arbitrage between the two oﬀerings.4 Alternatively, regulation (including antitrust
scrutiny) can constrain the price that the monopolist can charge for the essential input.
In light of these considerations our analysis focuses on tying incentives conditional on
the price of the tying product. Consistent with the traditional view, we find that the ability
to technological tie does not aﬀect market outcomes when the price of the tying good is
suﬃciently high. Otherwise, a technological tie, or even the threat of a technological tie, can
significantly impact market structure, prices, and innovation. In some cases, these impacts
have negative welfare consequences; in other cases, the ability to impose a technological tie
can actually increase social welfare. The ambiguity is due to multiple equilibria, as we
discuss shortly.
Economides (1998) shows that a price-regulated upstream monopolist participating in a
downstream Cournot (quantity-setting) oligopoly has an incentive for non-price discrimina-
tion.5 Our analysis develops this theme by analyzing the incentives for and consequences
of technological tying for product improvement in a downstream systems market where
firms compete on quality and price.6 In this paper, we consider the case of homogeneous
consumer preferences over vertically diﬀerentiated products. We defer consideration of
heterogeneous consumers and horizontal product diﬀerentiation for future research.
More specifically, we study markets for systems as duopoly games. Each ofM consumers
demands a system comprised of two components. Firm 1 oﬀers a system comprised of
one unit of component A and one unit of its version of component B. Firm 2 purchases
component A from Firm 1 at a predetermined price w,7 and oﬀers consumers a system
argument is that there is a single monopoly profit, which the owner of the essential input can capture by
charging a monopoly price.
4For example, suppose some consumers are willing to pay qi for computer systems consisting of an
operating system and application software, but other consumers would pay no more than w for a computer
with e-mail and Internet browsing capability and have no demand for other applications. If there are enough
consumers of the second type, Firm 1 would maximize profits by selling component A separately at price
w, provided that it can prevent rivals or consumers from purchasing the operating system at the lower price
and combining it with applications.
5 In line with Chicago School reasoning, no incentive for non-price discrimination exists if the input
monopolist is a less eﬃcient supplier of systems in the downstream market and the upstream price is profit-
maximizing. See Sibley and Weisman (1998), Bergman (2000), and Economides (2000).
6The new vertical foreclosure literature, which includes papers by Salop and Scheﬀman (1983), Kratten-
maker and Salop (1986), Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), Riordan and Salop (1995), Hart and Tirole
(1990), and Bolton and Whinston (1991) and Rey and Tirole (1997), identifies incentives for a firm that
operates in both upstream and downstream markets to use price and exclusionary contracts to influence
downstream competition and to “raise rivals’ costs”. Our analysis can be interpreted as an exploration of
technological tying as a raising rivals’ costs strategy.
7We assume that Firm 1 is commited to the wholesale price w. Without such a commitment, Firm 2
would not invest, because of the ability of Firm 1 to hold up Firm 2 by raising the wholesale price after Firm
2 has invested in product improvement. Farrell and Katz (2000) reach the same conclusion for their price
leadership model in which the integrated firm prices the essential component after observing the realized
qualities.
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that consists of component A and its version of component B.8 In our basic “product
improvement game,” given the wholesale price of component A, rival firms invest in quality
improvements of component B, and subsequently compete on the price of systems. In the
companion “technological tying game” there is also an intermediate stage in which Firm 1
can act to degrade the quality of Firm 2’s system.
Given that consumers have homogeneous preferences, the market has a winner-take-all
character and multiple equilibria of the product improvement game are possible. There
always exists an eﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium in which Firm 2 improves its product
optimally and captures the entire market. If the quality advantage of Firm 2 is suﬃciently
small, then there also exists an ineﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium in which Firm 1 invests
in product improvement and captures the market. In these equilibria, consumers enjoy
a positive surplus as long as the losing firm imposes some competitive price pressure on
the winner. There also can exist mixed strategy equilibria of the product improvement
game in which each of the firms invests with positive probabilities. Possible mixed strategy
equilibrium outcomes include one or the other firm investing alone, duplicative investments,
and a complete failure to invest.
The technological tying game, in contrast, has a unique equilibrium outcome if the whole-
sale price of the essential component is not too large. Firm 1 forecloses competition with an
actual or perhaps merely threatened technological tie,9 improves its product eﬃciently, and
sets a monopoly price that fully extracts consumer surplus. In this case, technological tying
distorts market structure and reduces consumer welfare by eliminating competition from
Firm 2. Surprisingly, technological tying can improve social welfare compared to a mixed
strategy equilibrium of the product improvement game, even though consumers are worse
oﬀ. The technological tying game also has a unique equilibrium outcome if the wholesale
price is suﬃciently close to the monopoly level. Firm 1 prefers the role of supplier to Firm
2 and declines to compete for the retail market. For an intermediate range of wholesale
prices, the technological tying game can have multiple equilibria in which both firms invest
with some probability, but Firm 1 forecloses its rival when both firms invest in product
improvement.
Farrell and Katz (2000) also study the incentives for product innovation and techno-
logical tying in a market for vertically diﬀerentiated systems. In their model, a monopoly
supplies an essential component and competes with others to supply a complementary com-
ponent to consumers who assemble a system. By “overinvesting” in product R&D for the
complementary component, the integrated firm squeezes the rents of rival suppliers and is
able to charge consumers more for the essential component.10 Moreover, the integrated
8While we assume that Firms 1 and 2 supply systems comprised of component A and firm-specific versions
of component B, our analysis would be unchanged if consumers were to purchase component A from Firm 1
and combine A with component B from Firm 1 or Firm 2. In this case component A can be an operating
system (e.g. Microsoft Windows), and component B can be an application program, such as Microsoft Word
or Wordperfect.
9When a merely threatened technological tie does the job, Firm 2 is foreclosed by a price squeeze, meaning
that the wholesale price is prohibitive compared to Firm 2’s equilibrium quality. Firm 2 declines to invest
in product quality because it rationally believes that Firm 1 would foreclose a competitive product with a
technological tie.
10See Bolton and Whinston (1993) and Kranton and Minehart (2002) for related models of strategic
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firm has no incentive to disadvantage rivals with a technological tie. These results depend
on their assumptions that the monopolist prices the essential component after observing
the qualities and prices of the competitively-supplied component. In contrast, we assume
that the wholesale price of the essential component is determined prior to systems market
competition. The diﬀerence is crucial for considering the integrated firm’s incentives for
technological tying.
Choi and Stefanadis (2001) analyze a model of a systems market that is similar in struc-
ture to Farrell and Katz (2000). In their model an incumbent owns two complementary
components and firms invest to lower the cost of one or both of the components, which
they may combine with a component owned by the incumbent. They compare investment
incentives with and without tying and show that tying strengthens the incumbent’s invest-
ment incentives. Choi, Lee and Stefanadis (2002) explore a similar model with discrete
investment. In contrast, our analysis focuses on the incentive for technological tying by an
integrated monopolist when a competitor requires access to an essential component of the
system at a predetermined price.
Section 2 describes the structure of the market for systems and the technology for
product improvement. This section introduces the assumptions that Firm 2 is the higher
quality supplier of systems when neither firm invests and that, by investing, Firm 1 can
leapfrog Firm 2’s quality advantage. These assumptions frame the policy issue by defining
an environment in which Firm 1 can use its control over access to the essential component
to influence investment incentives and thereby distort market outcomes. Section 3 intro-
duces the product improvement and technological tying games, identifies their pure strategy
equilibria, and examines the welfare properties of the pure strategy equilibrium outcomes.
Section 4 considers possible mixed strategy equilibria of these games and Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Vertical Product Diﬀerentiation
Systems are diﬀerentiated in quality, which is partly exogenous and partly endogenous.
Each of M identical consumers demands a single system. A consumer’s willingness-to-pay
for a system consisting of components A and B from firm i is
qi = γi + q(ri), (1)
where γi is an exogenous quality parameter specific to systems sold by Firm i and the
endogenous variable ri is Firm i’s investment in R&D to improve the quality of its system
(or, equivalently, the quality of its component B). For analytical convenience, we assume
that there are no additional variable costs of producing systems.
It is convenient to reinterpret (1) as Firm i choosing a level of quality improvement
zi = qi − γi
overinvestment.
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by incurring an R&D cost
ri = r(zi).
We maintain several additional assumptions.
A1: The symmetric R&D cost function r(z) is increasing, strictly convex, twice diﬀeren-
tiable, and satisfies r(0) = r0(0) = 0.
The first assumption implies that there is a unique zM that maximizes the net benefits
from quality improvement zM − r(z) and is the solution to r0(zM) =M . Thus zM is the
eﬃcient level of quality improvement for a firm selling to the entire market and
πM ≡ zMM − r(zM) > 0.
A2.: Γ ≡ γ2 − γ1 > 0.
The second assumption implies that Firm 2 is the more eﬃcient supplier of systems for
any level of investment in quality improvement.11
A3: πM > ΓM.
The third assumption implies that Firm 1 can profitably leapfrog Firm 2’s initial quality
advantage by investing eﬃciently in product improvement; i.e., (γ1 + z
M)M − r(zM) >
γ2M . Although this assumption is not necessary for some of our results, it describes an
environment in which investment eﬀects can dominate firm-specific eﬃciencies, which is the
focus of our analysis.
A4: w < w¯, where
w¯ ≡ γ2 + πM/M.
The fourth assumption simplifies our analysis by restricting attention to exogenous
wholesale prices of component A below the monopoly level, w¯. The maximum social
surplus in this market is γ2M + π
M , which corresponds to investment of zM by Firm 2.12
This surplus is fully extracted by Firm 1 with a wholesale price equal to w¯. Firm 1 is
content to supply Firm 2 as long as the wholesale discount below w¯ does not exceed Firm
2’s initial eﬃciency advantage, Γ. We make extensive use of w¯ below. For reference, note
that w¯ > γ1 and w¯ − Γ > γ2.
We compare the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of two diﬀerent game forms. In the
“product improvement game,” competition proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, the
11This assumption serves to emphasize the potential social costs of strategic conduct by a vertically
integrated supplier. The analysis for Γ ≤ 0 is similar; see footnote 14, below.
12More formally, let xM be the allocation of consumers to Firm 1 and (1−x)M the allocation to Firm 2,
and let z1 and z2 be the firms’ investments in quality improvement. The social planner chooses (x, z1, z2)
to maximize
W (x, z1, z2) =M [x (γ1 + z1) + (1− x) (γ2 + z2)]− r(z1)− r(z2).
Clearly W (0, 0, zM) > W (1, zM , 0). Furthermore, the convexity of r(z) implies that W (0, 0, zm) >
W (x, z1, z2) for x ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the welfare optimum has x = 0, z1 = 0, and z2 = zM .
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firms simultaneously and independently choose quality improvements zi at cost r(zi). In
the second stage, the firms simultaneously and independently set prices Pi ≥ w after observ-
ing each other’s quality. The “technological tying game” amends the product improvement
game by allowing the upstream monopolist to degrade the quality of its rival’s systems. In
the first stage, the firms choose costly quality improvements zi as in the product improve-
ment game. In the second stage, Firm 1 can degrade Firm 2’s quality by an amount δ ≥ 0.
In the final stage, the firms set prices.
The price subgame is the same in both game forms. Consumers observe prices and
qualities and choose the product that oﬀers the greatest net utility. Consumers have
identical preferences, so Firm i makes sales to allM consumers if qi−Pi > max(qj −Pj , 0).
When both products oﬀer the same net utility, consumers are assumed to choose the higher
quality product, and if both firms also have the same quality, then consumers are assumed
to choose Firm 1.
Equilibrium prices and sales in the market for systems depend on the level of w and
product qualities. In an equilibrium of the price subgame, only one firm sells to the entire
market. If q1 > q2 and q2 ≥ w, then Firm 2 sets price P2 = w and Firm 1 wins the market
at price P1 = q1 − q2 +w. A similar result holds for Firm 2 if q2 > q1 and q1 ≥ w, because
w is an opportunity cost of sales for Firm 1 and a direct cost for Firm 2. If q2 < w, then
Firm 1 wins the market at price P1 = q1 even if q1 < q2.
Summarizing, Firm 1 sells to all M customers at a price P1 = q1 − max(q2 − w, 0) if
q1 ≥ q2 or if w ≥ q2, and Firm 2 sells to allM customers at a price P2 = q2−max(q1−w, 0)
if q2 > q1 and w < q2. The losing firm serves as a competitive check when the quality of
its system is above its opportunity cost.13
We begin by analyzing the pure strategy equilibria of the product improvement and
technological tying games. The pure strategy equilibria of the product improvement game
illustrate the ability and incentives of a firm that controls an essential input to improve its
system in order to gain a competitive advantage over downstream rivals. The upstream
monopolist may win the market with a better product even when it would be more eﬃcient
for a downstream rival to engage in product improvement. Thus, an ex post measure of
product superiority can be a misleading indicator of market performance.
Technological tying by an upstream monopolist is another source of market failure. A
technological tie can eﬀectively foreclose downstream rivals from participating in the market
for systems. When technological tying is feasible and the price of the upstream good is
insuﬃciently remunerative, the upstream monopolist has an incentive to foreclose rivals and
to substitute its own innovative eﬀorts.
Pure strategy equilibria are natural outcomes in a winner-take-all market when firms are
able to coordinate their investment decisions. In contrast, mixed strategy equilibria describe
industry conduct when firms are uncertain about the investment decisions of their rivals.
After characterizing and comparing pure strategy equilibria, we consider mixed strategy
13Let xM be Firm 1’s sales of systems, with x ∈ [0, 1]. Firm 2’s sales are (1 − x)M. If w is the price
of component A, then the respective profits of the two firms are π1 = (P1x + w(1 − x))M − r(z1) =
(P1 −w)xM +wM − r(z1) and π2 = (P2 −w)(1− x)M − r(z2). The wholesale price of component A (w),
is an opportunity cost of system sales for Firm 1 as well as a direct marginal cost for Firm 2.
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equilibria of both the product improvement and the technological tying games. We show
that total expected welfare can be lower when firms play mixed strategies compared to a
product improvement game in which firms play pure strategies. This is a consequence
of both the low and redundant investment levels that can occur when firms play mixed
strategies. As in the case of pure strategy equilibria, technological tying is potentially
costly because it facilitates product improvement and market dominance by a less eﬃcient
firm. Nonetheless, technological tying is also potentially beneficial because it avoids the
ineﬃciencies from low and redundant investments that can occur in mixed strategy equilibria
of the product improvement game.
3 Pure strategies
3.1 The Product Improvement Game
We begin with the product improvement game. In stage 1, the firms invest in quality
improvement anticipating the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of the price subgame discussed
above. It is immediate that both firms cannot make positive investments in a pure strategy
equilibrium. One of the firms will capture the entire market, leaving the other firm better
oﬀ not investing.
Proposition 1 There does not exist a pure strategy equilibrium of the product improvement
game in which both firms make positive investments. Either z1 = 0 or z2 = 0 in equilibrium.
Given our maintained assumptions, there always exists an equilibrium in which Firm 2
captures the entire market. This equilibrium is eﬃcient because Firm 2 has an exogenous
quality advantage.
Proposition 2 There exists a pure strategy equilibrium of the product improvement game
in which Firm 2 invests eﬃciently (z2 = zM) and Firm 1 does not invest in quality im-
provement (z1 = 0). Firm 2 sets a price equal to P2 = γ2 + z
M −max(γ1 − w, 0), sells
systems to all M customers, and earns π2 = [w¯−w−max(γ1 −w, 0)]M ≥ 0. Firm 1 sets
price P1 = w, sells M units of component A and no systems, and earns π1 = wM .
Proof. Suppose Firm 1 deviates from the assumed equilibrium by investing z1 > 0.
This cannot be profitable unless Firm 1 can win the market from Firm 2, which requires
z1 ≥ zM +Γ. The best deviation for Firm 1 maximizes π1 =
³
z1 − zM − Γ+w
´
M −r(z1)
subject to this constraint. Convexity of r(z) implies that the constraint binds and Firm 1’s
maximum deviation profit is π1 = wM−r(zM+Γ) < wM . Thus Firm 1 earns less profit by
deviating from z1 = 0. Given that Firm 1 chooses z1 = 0, the profit-maximizing investment
for Firm 2 is z2 = zM . Firm 2’s profit is π2 = [w¯−w −max(γ1 −w, 0)]M.
In the eﬃcient equilibrium, Firm 1 is eﬀectively foreclosed from competing with Firm 2
if w > γ1. Firm 2’s profit in this case is the maximum surplus w¯M, less its payments to
Firm 1 for component A. Firm 2’s profit is independent of w for w ≤ γ1. In this range,
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Firm 1 exercises a competitive constraint on Firm 2’s pricing equal to γ1 − w, so Firm 2’s
net profit is [w¯ − γ1]M.
Firm 1 does not profit by investing in quality improvement if it expects Firm 2 to do
so. However, there may exist an alternative equilibrium in which only Firm 1 invests
in product improvement. By assumption, Firm 1 can profitably leapfrog Firm 2’s initial
quality advantage by investing eﬃciently. Moreover, if r(zM) ≥ ΓM , then Firm 2 cannot
profitably leapfrog Firm 1’s post-investment product quality.
Proposition 3 There exists a pure strategy equilibrium of the product improvement game
in which Firm 1 invests z1 = zM and Firm 2 does not invest if and only if r(zM) ≥ ΓM .
Firm 1 sets price P1 = γ1 + z
M −max(γ2 − w, 0), sells systems to all M customers, and
earns π1 = [w¯ − Γ −max(γ2 − w, 0)]M ≥ 0. Firm 2 sets price P2 = w, sells no systems,
and earns π2 = 0.
Proof. If z1 = zM and z2 = 0, Firm 1 will make all sales at a price equal to P1 =
γ1+z
M −max(γ2−w, 0). If w ≤ γ2, then P1 = zM −Γ+w and Firm 1 earns a profit equal
to π1 = πM − ΓM + wM ≥ wM given the “leapfrogging” assumption A3. Furthermore,
Firm 1 has no incentive to deviate and earn π1 = wM by choosing z1 = 0, and has no
incentive to choose any other level of quality improvement. If it is profitable for Firm 2 to
deviate, then Firm 2 would choose zM and earn π2 = ΓM − r(zM). Therefore, Firm 2 has
no incentive to deviate if ΓM −r(zM) ≤ 0. If w > γ2, then P1 = γ1+zM and Firm 1 earns
an equilibrium profit equal to π1 = [w¯−Γ]M . If Firm 1 were to deviate and choose z1 = 0,
then Firm 1 would earn only γ1M (because Firm 2 is foreclosed by w > γ2). Thus Firm 1
has no incentive to deviate. Firm 2 has no incentive to deviate by the same reasoning as
before.
In the equilibrium in which only Firm 1 invests, Firm 2 is foreclosed even though it
is able to produce systems more eﬃciently ex ante. Such foreclosure can occur for any
price of component A for suitable parameter values. By improving its system, Firm 1
endogenously becomes such a formidable competitor that Firm 2 cannot eﬀectively compete.
For illustration, Figure 1 shows the payoﬀs to Firm 1 in each of the possible pure strategy
equilibria as a function of w.14
The pure strategy equilibria of the product improvement game show that one cannot
rely on ex post market structure to infer which firm is the more eﬃcient supplier. Product
superiority is endogenous and in our model either firm can invest to become the market
leader. In particular, the firm that has a quality disadvantage can overcome its disadvantage
by investing in quality. Having done so, the more eﬃcient firm cannot profitably invest
to win the market even though it can supply a better product than its rival. Thus the
“wrong” firm can emerge as the market leader. This indeterminacy exists even when the
owner of component A does not engage in technological tying to impede access by its rival.
The next section explores equilibrium outcomes when such strategies are feasible.
14 We have assumed that Γ > 0. If Γ ≤ 0, then an equilibrium exists in which the more eﬃcient Firm 1
invests zM for any 0 ≤ w ≤ w¯ − Γ. There is a second equilibrium in which the less eﬃcient Firm 2 invests
zM if 0 ≤ w ≤ w¯ and r(zM ) > −ΓM. The component price would foreclose Firm 2 if w¯ < w ≤ w¯ − Γ.
Firm 1 would leapfrog Firm 2’s post-investment quality if r(zM) ≤ −ΓM.
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3.2 The Technological Tying Game
Firm 1 can avoid competition from Firm 2 by foreclosing Firm 2’s access to component A,
which we assume is available only from Firm 1. It conceivably might do this by contractually
conditioning the purchase of A on the purchase of its component B, by selling a system
consisting of components A and B and refraining from selling A separately (a pure bundling
strategy), by charging a price for component A that is so high that Firm 2 cannot compete
(or, equivalently, refusing to sell component A), or by designing component A so that a
system performs worse when used with Firm 2’s component B. This last strategy is a
technological tie. A technological tie lowers the quality of a system made with component
B from Firm 2 by an amount δ. That is, q2 = γ2+z2−δ and we assume that q1 is unchanged
by the tie at γ1 + z1. A technological tie forecloses competition if δ is suﬃciently large.
Foreclosure strategies that are based on a contractual tie, pure system sales, or refusals to
deal in the upstream product may be ineﬀective if there is a separate demand for component
A that the upstream monopolist wishes to serve. In contrast, a technological tie that
obstructs the ability of Firm 2 to oﬀer a competitive system product, or makes it expensive
for consumers to assemble a system using component B from Firm 2, does not limit the
ability of the upstream monopolist to pursue a mixed bundling strategy in which the firm
both sells systems and makes separate sales of component A in a diﬀerent market. For
simplicity, we assume that technological tying is costless for Firm 1 (other than the indirect
cost of lost revenues from sales of component A to Firm 2) and consider only Firm 1’s
incentives to engage in this activity. Foreclosure is clearly ineﬃcient because it eliminates
competition from a more eﬃcient producer. Nonetheless, Firm 1 may profit by foreclosing
production by Firm 2 under some circumstances.
Consider the following three-stage “technological tying game,” which amends the basic
product improvement game studied in the previous subsection. In stage one, the firms
choose costly quality improvements zi as before. In stage two, Firm 1 is able to impose a
technological tie that degrades Firm 2’s quality by an amount δ ≥ 0. In stage three, the
firms set prices Pi ≥ w as before.
With vertical product diﬀerentiation, Firm 1 may profit by degrading Firm 2’s quality
only if it wins the system competition; i.e., only if q1 > q2 − δ. Thus, it is suﬃcient
to focus on technological tying strategies that foreclose Firm 2 from the market. The
following proposition establishes the existence of a unique pure strategy equilibrium outcome
of the technological tying game for suﬃciently low values of the component price. When
w < w¯ − Γ, Firm 1 invests zM and Firm 2 is foreclosed from the systems market by either
an actual or threatened technological tie. For very low values of w (w < γ2), Firm 1
would foreclose Firm 2 with a technological tie. For intermediate values of w, Firm 1 has
no need to impose a technological tie in equilibrium because Firm 2 poses no competitive
threat unless it invests and Firm 2 is deterred from investing by the credible threat of a
technological tie if it were to leapfrog Firm 1. Although the threat of a technological tie is
critical to the equilibrium outcome, whether or not Firm 1 actually imposes a technological
tie in equilibrium in this case has no eﬀect on profits or welfare.
Proposition 4 In the technological tying game:
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(i) There exists an equilibrium in which Firm 1 invests zM , Firm 2 does not invest,
and Firm 1 forecloses Firm 2 with a technological tie. In this equilibrium, Firm 1 sets
P1 = γ1 + z
M , sells systems to the entire market, and earns π1 = [w¯− Γ]M . Firm 2 sets
P2 = w and earns π2 = 0.
(ii) If and only if γ2 ≤ w < γ1 + zM , there exists an equilibrium in which Firm 1
invests zM and Firm 2 does not invest. Firm 1 does not impose a technological tie, sets
P1 = γ1 + z
M , sells systems to the entire market, and earns π1 = [w¯− Γ]M . Firm 2 sets
P2 = w and earns π2 = 0.
(iii) If and only if w ≥ w¯ − Γ, there exists an equilibrium in which Firm 2 invests zM
and Firm 1 does not invest. Firm 1 does not impose a technological tie. Firm 2 sets
P2 = γ2 + z
M , sells systems to the entire market, and earns π2 = [w¯ − w]M . Firm 1 sets
P1 = w and earns π1 = wM .
(iv) There are no other pure strategy equilibria.
Proof. Given the winner-take-all nature of the market, 0 < zi < zM is never a best





. For any value of w, there is an equilibrium in which Firm 1 invests, Firm
2 does not invest, and Firm 1 imposes a technological tie. The tie makes it unprofitable
for Firm 2 to invest, and if Firm 2 does not invest, then it is costless for Firm 1 to impose
the tie. The most that Firm 2 would pay for the component is γ2M . By investing and
foreclosing Firm 2 with a technological tie, Firm 1 sets P1 = γ1 + z
M , sells systems to the
entire market, and earns π1 = [w¯−Γ]M. By Assumption A3, w¯−Γ > γ2, so foreclosure is
profitable.
If w < w¯−Γ, investing zM and foreclosing Firm 2 with a technological tie is a dominant
strategy for Firm 1. This strategy is clearly subgame perfect because, with a tie, Firm 1
earns (γ1+ z
M)M at the second stage, which exceeds wM when w < w¯−Γ. Firm 2’s best
response to this strategy is to invest zero. Any lesser investment by Firm 1 would yield a
lower profit. Any positive investment by Firm 2 that threatened Firm 1’s profit would be
undone by the technological tie.
If w ≥ γ2, Firm 1 has no need to tie when Firm 2 does not invest because Firm 2 is
foreclosed by the high component price. Furthermore, if w < γ1+z
M , Firm 1 would impose
a tie even if Firm 2 invests. Thus, if γ2 ≤ w < γ1+zM , there exists an equilibrium in which
Firm 1 invests zM and Firm 2 does not invest. Firm 1 does not impose a technological tie,
sets P1 = γ1 + z
M , sells systems to the entire market, and earns π1 = [w¯ − Γ]M . Firm 2
sets P2 = w and earns π2 = 0.
If w ≥ w¯−Γ, then there is also an equilibrium in which Firm 2 invests, Firm 1 does not
invest, and Firm 1 does not impose a technological tie. In the second stage, Firm 1 would
earn γ1M if it imposes a tie, which is less than it would earn by selling the component to
Firm 2. In this equilibrium Firm 2 sets P2 = γ2 + z
M , sells systems to the entire market,
and earns π2 = [w¯ −w]M . Firm 1 sets P1 = w and earns π1 = wM .
Summarizing, for any value of w, there is an equilibrium in which Firm 1 invests, Firm 2
does not invest, and Firm 1 imposes a tie. This is the unique equilibrium if w < γ2. For
γ2 ≤ w < γ1 + zM , there is an additional equilibrium in which Firm 1 invests zM , Firm 2
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does not invest, and Firm 1 does not impose a technological tie. For w ≥ w¯ − Γ, a third
equilibrium exists in which Firm 2 invests zM , Firm 1 does not invest and does not impose
a technological tie. This last equilibrium Pareto-dominates the equilibrium in which Firm
1 invests and is consistent with the standard Chicago School result that a firm does not
benefit from a technological tie if it can charge the monopoly price for an essential upstream
input.15
The mere threat of a technological tie is suﬃcient to foreclose Firm 2 when γ2 ≤ w <
γ1 + z
M . In equilibrium, Firm 2 responds to the threat by declining to invest. Firm 1
invests in an eﬃcient level of R&D and provides a superior system to Firm 2. In this case,
no actual anticompetitive behavior is ever observed. Yet market structure is distorted and
the more eﬃcient supplier of systems is eﬀectively foreclosed by the ability of the vertically
integrated firm to impose a technological tie and its incentive to do so oﬀ the equilibrium
path.
Firm 1 does not benefit from tying when w ≥ w¯−Γ. In this case, the ability to impose
a technological tie is a trap that the tying firm would prefer to avoid. Nonetheless there
is an equilibrium in which the less eﬃcient Firm 1 invests and imposes a tie. Thus, when
w ≥ w¯−Γ, Firm 1 has no profitable use for a technological tie, either threatened or actual,
and would be better oﬀ if it could relinquish the ability to impose a tie.16
3.3 Welfare
We now consider the welfare implications of the pure strategy equilibria of the product
improvement and the technological tying games. Social welfare is obviously at a maximum
in the eﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium of the product improvement game. Nonetheless,
consumers (weakly) prefer the ineﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium to the eﬃcient one. With
Bertrand competition, the equilibrium price is the quality level of the investing firm less the
margin between quality and cost for the rival firm, provided this margin is positive. This
margin determines consumer surplus. The margin is (weakly) larger for Firm 2 because
Firm 2’s quality level exceeds Firm 1’s when neither firm invests. Firm 2 is a greater
competitive threat to Firm 1 in the ineﬃcient equilibrium than Firm 1 is to Firm 2 in the
eﬃcient equilibrium. Consumers benefit directly from the greater competitive threat of
Firm 2 in the ineﬃcient equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Consumer surplus is weakly higher in the ineﬃcient pure strategy equilib-
rium of the product improvement game than in the eﬃcient equilibrium, and strictly higher
when w < γ2.
15 We have assumed that Γ > 0. If Γ ≤ 0, Firm 1’s dominant strategy is to foreclose Firm 2 and invest
zM . This strategy extracts the maximum attainable surplus, πM = (w¯−Γ)M. Foreclosure can be achieved
with a technological tie or a suﬃciently high component price.
16AT&T’s voluntary divestiture of Western Electric was explained in part by the costs of being both a
supplier to downstream firms and a competitor of those firms. Our analysis confirms that the ability to
distort downstream competition can indeed be liability that a monopoly supplier of an essential component
would want to relinquish.
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Proof. The surplus that each consumer enjoys from the purchase of system i is CSi =
qi − Pi. The equilibrium price of system i when qi > qj is Pi = qi − max(qj − w; 0).
Therefore, consumer surplus when Firm i wins the market is CSi = max(qj − w, 0). It
follows that CS1 ≥ CS2, with a strict inequality when γ2 > w.
The ability of Firm 1 to impose a technological tie obviously threatens social welfare
when there is a unique equilibrium of the product improvement game. If r(zM) < ΓM,
eﬃcient investment by Firm 2 is the unique pure strategy equilibrium market structure.
However, equilibria with tying exist for all values of w and Firm 1 has a strictly positive
incentive to impose a technological tie unless the wholesale price for the component input is
suﬃciently remunerative. When r(zM) < ΓM, technological tying destroys the possibility
of an eﬃcient market structure.
Corollary 1 If r(zM) < ΓM, then technological tying reduces social welfare relative
to the pure strategy equilibrium of the product improvement game.
If r(zM) ≥ ΓM, there are multiple pure strategy equilibria of the product improvement
game. Technological tying does not improve total welfare in this case and can reduce
welfare by preventing an eﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium.
Corollary 2 If r(zM) ≥ ΓM , then technological tying weakly reduces social welfare
relative to pure strategy equilibria of the product improvement game. If the eﬃcient
equilibrium is focal, then technological tying strictly reduces social welfare. Otherwise, the
ability of Firm 1 to technologically tie is irrelevant for market structure and social welfare
(but not for consumer welfare).
Technological tying is never in the interest of consumers. It is evident from Proposition
4 that consumer surplus is zero for all values of w in the technological tying game. Tying
eliminates Firm 2 as a potential competitor when Firm 1 invests, and the high component
price eliminates Firm 1 as a potential competitor when Firm 2 invests and wins the market.
Absent any eﬀective competition, consumer surplus is fully extracted.
Corollary 3 Consumer welfare is weakly lower in the technological tying game than in
the product improvement game. If w < γ2, then consumer surplus is strictly lower in the
technological tying game relative to the ineﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium of the product
improvement game. If w < γ1, then consumer surplus also is strictly lower relative to the
eﬃcient equilibrium of the product improvement game.
An important caveat is in order. The above welfare analysis is premised on the as-
sumption that the exogenous wholesale price is the same in the product improvement game
and the corresponding technological tying game. The assumption seems most reasonable
when the wholesale price is determined by regulation. It seems less reasonable if it is a
market price. A possibility that we alluded to earlier is that technological tying may allow
the upstream monopolist to price discriminate between diﬀerent uses for the component.
The non-discriminatory profit-maximizing price that the upstream monopolist would charge
without technological tying is a compromise between the profit-maximizing prices for each
possible use. Technological tying would allow the firm eﬀectively to set a high price for
the component when it is used as part of a system, and a low price for other uses. In this
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case, a prohibition against technological tying could cause the wholesale price to increase,
depending on the price elasticities of demand for other uses. This possibility tempers the
case against technological tying.
4 Mixed strategies
4.1 The Product Improvement Game
The product improvement game lacks pure strategy equilibria in which both firms invest
(Proposition 1). Moreover, firms’ preferences over alternative equilibria disagree if the
wholesale price of the component is low. When w < w¯ − Γ, Firm 1 strictly prefers the
ineﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium in which it invests and forecloses Firm 2. Firm 2,
of course, prefers the eﬃcient equilibrium in which it wins the market. There would be
a compelling case to restrict our analysis to the pure strategy equilibria of the games if
the firms could coordinate their R&D investments. This could come about because, for
example, one of the firms gets to move first in its choice of R&D expenditure. However,
the characteristics of R&D investment do not suggest that such coordination would be easy.
Firms often invest with limited information about their rivals’ investments and there is often
no natural first mover in R&D. Absent coordination on a pure strategy equilibrium, mixed
strategy equilibria in which both firms invest with some probability are plausible. The pos-
sibilities of wasteful investments in product improvement, deficient product improvement,
or no investments at all, are all realistic outcomes when firms are unsure of each other’s
incentives and must form beliefs about what the other will do.17
In general, there exist multiple mixed strategy equilibria. The Appendix shows that in
any mixed strategy equilibrium, at least one firm’s strategy must have at least one discrete
component.18 To keep things simple we only consider mixed strategy equilibria in which











2 . While equilibrium
mixed strategies involving three or more discrete levels of investment may exist, our focus
on binary mixed strategy equilibria is suﬃcient to demonstrate that welfare conclusions
depend on equilibrium selection and that consumers can be better oﬀ when the firms play
mixed strategies.
There are two possible binary mixed strategy equilibria to consider, depending on which
firm wins the market when both firms invest at high levels. The first candidate mixed
strategy equilibrium features zH2 ≥ zH1 − Γ. The more eﬃcient Firm 2 is sure to win the
market by investing high and does so eﬃciently by choosing zH2 = z
M . This being the case,
Firm 1 only has an incentive to invest if it wins when Firm 2 invests low, i.e. zH1 ≥ zL2 +Γ.
17Mixed strategy equilibria can be interpreted in terms of each player’s beliefs about the actions of others.
Alternatively, it is possible to “purify” mixed strategy equilibria along the lines of Harsanyi (1973) as the
limit of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of a corresponding game of incomplete information in which the two
firms are unsure of each other’s incentive for product improvement. Thus the mixed strategy equilibrium
has a realistic interpretation as rational conduct in a strategically uncertain market environment. Following
a diﬀerent approach, Cheng and Zhu (1995) show that if agents have quadratic utility, mixed strategy
equilibria exist with unique best-reply probabilities for each agent.
18This assumes Γ > 0. A symmetric continuous mixed strategy equilibrium may exist if Γ = 0.
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Firm 2 also has an incentive for a lower level of investment that wins the market when
Firm 1 invests low. As there are no other scenarios for profitable investment, Firm 1’s low
level of investment is zero.
Proposition 6 For Γ suﬃciently small, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists in which Firm 2
randomizes between zM and zL2 and Firm 1 randomizes between z
H
1 and 0, with z
M ≥
zH1 − Γ > zL2 > 0 if and only if:
w ≤ γ2 + zL2 (2)
r0(zH1 )(z
H
1 − zL2 − Γ) = r(zH1 ) (3)
r0(zL2 )(z
L
2 + Γ)− r(zL2 ) = πM − (zH1 − Γ)M + r0(zL2 )zH1 . (4)
Firm 1 invests zH1 with probability




and Firm 2 invests zM with probability




The equilibrium exists if ΓM < r(zM).
The proof is in the Appendix. Firm 1 must be indiﬀerent between not investing and
investing zH1 given Firm 2’s strategy. Furthermore, z
H
1 must be locally optimal. Together,
these conditions imply equations (3) and (6). Similarly, Firm 2 must be indiﬀerent between
investing zM and zL2 given Firm 1’s strategy, and z
L
2 must be locally optimal. These
conditions imply equations (4) and (5). Moreover, w must not be so large as to foreclose
either zH1 or z
L
2 . Since z
H
1 + γ1 > z
L
2 + γ2, the binding condition is w ≤ zL2 + γ2. The
mixed strategy equilibrium in Proposition 6 exists only if Γ is suﬃciently small; otherwise
equations (3)-(4) do not have an appropriate solution.
As an example, consider the quadratic case: r(z) = 12kz


























The mixed strategy equilibrium exists if w ≤ γ2 + zL2 and Γ < 12m.
There may exist other mixed strategy equilibria. For example, under some conditions
there is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which Firm 1 randomizes between zM and zL1 and
Firm 2 randomizes between zH2 and 0, with z
M ≥ zH2 + Γ > zL1 ≥ 0. These two equilibria


























The Appendix shows that this equilibrium exists if w ≤ γ1 + zL1 and Γ < 14m.
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4.2 The Technological Tying Game
Mixed strategy equilibria also can exist for the technological tying game, but only for high
values of w. In the technological tying game, if w is suﬃciently small, Firm 1’s optimal
strategy is to foreclose Firm 2. It does this by imposing a technological tie in the second
stage of the tying game if Firm 2 is not already foreclosed by a price squeeze; i.e. a
prohibitive component price.
Proposition 7 Investing zM and imposing a technological tie is a dominant strategy for
Firm 1 when w < w¯ − Γ.
Proof. Firm 1’s profit if it imposes a technological tie and forecloses Firm 2 is
πtie1 = maxz1
{(γ1 + z1)M − r(z1)} = (w¯ − Γ)M.
If Firm 1 does not foreclose, its profit is either
πno tie1 = wM
if it sells the component to Firm 2 or
πno tie1 = maxz1
{[γ1 + z1 −max(γ2 + z2 −w, 0)]M − r(z1)}
≤ (w¯− Γ)M.
if it sells systems. A suﬃcient condition for πtie1 ≥ πno tie1 is w < w¯ − Γ. Hence, tying is
a dominant strategy for Firm 1 if w < w¯ − Γ.
The component price would foreclose Firm 2 if w > γ2 + z2. In that case, tying is
only a weakly dominant strategy. Tying is a strictly dominant strategy if w < w¯ − Γ and
w ≤ γ2 + z2.
Because tying is a dominant strategy for Firm 1 when w < w¯ − Γ, mixed strategy
equilibria of the tying game can exist only for higher values of w. Furthermore, in the
limit as Γ→ 0, tying is a dominant strategy for any w < w¯. Consequently, mixed strategy
equilibria do not exist for the tying game for Γ suﬃciently small.
Corollary 4 Only pure strategy equilibria of the technological tying game exist when
Γ is suﬃciently small.
Surprisingly, a mixed strategy equilibrium of the technological tying game exists under
some conditions when w ≥ w − Γ. In this case, Firm 1 and Firm 2 both prefer the
pure strategy equilibrium in which Firm 2 captures the market. In the mixed strategy
equilibrium, however, the firms fail to coordinate their beliefs on this outcome. Firm 1
invests in product improvement with positive probability out of a concern that Firm 2 might
fail to improve its product. And having invested, Firm 1’s finds it in its own self interest
to impose a technological tie even when Firm 2 does invest. Firm 2, for its part, becomes
hesitant to invest out of fear that Firm 1 will also invest and impose a technological tie.
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Proposition 8 In the technological tying game, there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium
in which Firm 1 randomizes between zM and zL1 and Firm 2 randomizes between z
H
2 and 0
with zM > zH2 + Γ > z
L
1 if and only if
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w¯ − Γ ≤ w < γ1 + zM −
r(zM − Γ)
r0(zM − Γ) ,
r0(zL1 )(w− (γ1 + zL1 )) + r(zL1 ) =M(w − γ1)− πM ,
r0(zH2 )(z
H
2 + γ2 −w)− r(zH2 ) = 0,
and Γ < zM . Firm 1 invests zM with probability
α = 1− r
0(zL2 )
M
and Firm 2 invests zH2 with probability




Firm 1 imposes a technological tie whenever γ1 + z1 > w.
Proof. See Appendix.
Using these results, direct calculation proves the following special case.
Corollary 5 Suppose r(z) = 12kz
2 and define m ≡ Mk . A binary mixed strategy of the
technological tying game exists in which Firm 1 randomizes over zM and zL1 = 2[w−(w¯−Γ)]
and Firm 2 randomizes over zH2 = 2(w − γ2) and 0 if and only if
w¯ − Γ < w < w¯− 1
2
Γ.
We focus the rest of our analysis of mixed strategies on the binary equilibria described in
Propositions 6 and 8 for the product improvement game and the technological tying game,
respectively. We implicitly assume that other mixed strategy equilibria are not selected.
This approach is suﬃcient to demonstrate the implications of equilibrium selection for
evaluating technological tying.
4.3 Welfare
How do consumers fare if the firms play a mixed strategy equilibrium? The next proposition
demonstrates that consumers do better in the mixed strategy equilibrium of the product
improvement game than in the eﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium. They may do better
or worse than in the ineﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium (which yields max(γ2 − w, 0)),
depending on parameters.






r0(zM ) , which is satisfied for
convex r(·).
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Proposition 9 Expected consumer surplus is higher in the mixed strategy equilibrium of the
product improvement game (of Proposition 6) than in the eﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1 : w ≤ γ1. Consumer surplus (for each of the M consumers) in the eﬃcient pure
strategy equilibrium is equal to γ1 − w with probability one. Expected consumer surplus
in the mixed strategy equilibrium is
CSmixed = γ1 −w + α (1− β) (zL2 + Γ) + αβzH1 > γ1 −w.
Case 2 : γ1 < w ≤ γ2 + zL2 .20 Consumers get zero surplus in the eﬃcient pure strategy
equilibrium. Expected consumer surplus in the mixed strategy equilibrium is
CSmixed = α (1− β) (zL2 + Γ) + αβzH1 + α(γ1 −w)
≥ αβ(zH1 − zL2 − Γ) > 0.
Corollary 6 Expected consumer surplus is a decreasing function of the wholesale price
w.
This last result follows from the fact that competitive pressure is greater when the
wholesale price is less.
Social welfare (measured by social surplus) obviously is highest in the eﬃcient pure
strategy equilibrium. But how do the mixed strategy and the ineﬃcient pure strategy
equilibria of the product improvement game compare from a social welfare perspective?
The answer is not obvious.
Total welfare in the mixed strategy equilibrium of the product improvement game is
equal to














M − r(zH1 )
i
+(1− α) (1− β) [γ2M + π(zL2 )].
where π(z) ≡ zM − r(z). Note that π(z) < πM if z < zM . The level of welfare in the
eﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium is Wpure+ = γ2M + π
M . Welfare is lower in the mixed
strategy equilibrium compared to the eﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium for three reasons.
First, market structure is distorted because the less eﬃcient Firm 1 sometimes wins the
market in the mixed strategy equilibrium. Second, there is wasteful investment in product
improvement when both firms invest. Third, product improvement is deficient when neither
firm invests at the eﬃcient level zM .





The comparison with the ineﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium is less clear on first inspec-
tion. The level of welfare in the ineﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium isWpure− = γ1M+π
M .
Therefore, the diﬀerence in welfare between the eﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium and the
mixed strategy equilibrium is
Wmixed −Wpure− = α (1− β)
h






ΓM − r(zH1 )
i
+(1− α) (1− β)
h
ΓM − πM + π(zL2 )
i
.
The first term is negative, because Firm 1 has deficient investment incentives in the mixed
strategy equilibrium and there is redundant investment by Firm 2. The second term
is positive because the mixed strategy equilibrium sometimes selects an eﬃcient market
structure. The third term is ambiguous because, even though Firm 2 is more eﬃcient,
Firm 1’s investment in product improvement is wasteful. The fourth term is also ambiguous
because ΓM < πM from assumption A3 (Firm 1 can profitably leapfrog Firm 2) and π(z2) ≥
0. Thus, on the one hand, the mixed strategy equilibrium sometimes beneficially achieves a
more eﬃcient market structure. On the other hand, a pure strategy equilibrium eliminates
wasteful investment and improves investment incentives. Thus it appears that welfare may
be higher or lower in the mixed strategy equilibrium, depending on the strength of these
various eﬀects.
It is, however, possible to resolve this ambiguity when Firm 2’s eﬃciency advantage is
small.
Proposition 10 Expected welfare is lower in the mixed strategy equilibrium than in an
ineﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium of the product improvement game if Γ is suﬃciently
small.
Proof. >From equation (7), as Γ→ 0,
Wmixed −Wpure− → α(1− β)[π(zH1 )− πM − r(zL2 )] (8)
−αβr(zH1 ) + (1− α)(1− β)[−πM + π(zL2 )].
Each term on the right-hand-side of (8) is negative.
The result that expected welfare is lower in the mixed strategy equilibrium than in the
pure strategy equilibria of the product improvement game as Γ → 0 is intuitive. The
mixed strategy equilibria incur unnecessary costs when both firms invest and, in the limit
as Γ → 0, provide no benefit when Firm 2 invests instead of Firm 1. Figure 2 compares
expected total welfare in the mixed and pure strategy equilibria when the R&D function
has the form r(z) = kz2 for diﬀerent values of Γ. Note that the mixed strategy equilibrium
yields slightly greater expected welfare than the ineﬃcient pure strategy for some values of
Γ.
A welfare analysis of technological tying is more complicated when there exists a mixed
strategy equilibrium of the product improvement game. When w < w¯ − Γ, technological
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tying accomplishes the same market structure as the ineﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium.
As observed in Proposition 10, expected social welfare in the mixed strategy equilibrium is
lower than social welfare in an ineﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium when Γ is suﬃciently
small. Therefore, technological tying can increase social welfare when a mixed strategy
exists and is focal.
Corollary 7 If w < w¯ − Γ and Γ is suﬃciently small, technological tying increases
social welfare relative to the mixed strategy equilibrium of the product improvement game.
Allowing for mixed strategy equilibria does not change the conclusion that technological
tying is not in the interest of consumers. Consumers earn no surplus in the mixed strategy
equilibria of the tying game because tying eliminates Firm 2 as a potential competitor when
Firm 1 wins the market and the high component price eliminates Firm 1 as a potential
competitor when Firm 2 wins the market. However, mixed strategy equilibria of the tying
game exist only for w ≥ w¯ − Γ > γ2 and consumers earn no surplus in the pure strategy
equilibria of the product improvement game when w ≥ γ2. Thus, consumers are no worse
oﬀ in a mixed strategy tying equilibrium than they are in the pure strategy equilibria of
the product improvement game, but they are better oﬀ compared to a mixed strategy
equilibrium of the product improvement game. Thus, we can generalize Corollary 3.
Corollary 8 Consumer welfare is weakly lower in pure and mixed strategy equilibria of
the technological tying game compared to pure and mixed strategy equilibria of the product
improvement game.
5 Conclusions
We have examined the causes and consequences of technological tying in a winner-take-all
model of a market for systems. In this model, a vertically integrated upstream monop-
olist supplies an essential component to a more eﬃcient independent competitor in the
downstream systems market. The two firms compete on the price and quality for sales
to consumers with homogeneous preferences over these vertically diﬀerentiated products.
If the wholesale price of the essential component is insuﬃciently remunerative, then the
upstream monopolist has an incentive to foreclose rival systems, either by selling only sys-
tems, contractually tying components, or designing an essential component so that it works
better with its own systems. The equilibrium market structure is ineﬃcient in this case.
A technological tie, or even in some cases the mere threat of technological tie, can reduce
social welfare by distorting market structure.
The ambiguity regarding the welfare eﬀects of technological tying has to do with the na-
ture of equilibrium when technological tying is infeasible for the vertically-integrated firm,
e.g. due to antitrust enforcement. In some cases, a mixed strategy equilibrium can emerge
when technological tying is infeasible. If a mixed strategy equilibrium exists and is focal,
then the prevention of technological tying reduces social welfare under some conditions. If
instead an eﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium is focal, then preventing technological tying in-
creases social welfare. If the ineﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium is focal, then technological
tying is irrelevant for social welfare.
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If the wholesale price of the essential component is suﬃciently near the monopoly price,
then the upstream monopolist and independent downstream firm both prefer a pure strategy
equilibrium in which the upstream monopolist supplies the component eﬃciently and the
independent firm wins the downstreammarket. Surprisingly, in this case there can also exist
a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the vertically integrated firm invests with positive
probability to improve its product and forecloses the more eﬃcient downstream firm with
a technological tie. This unfortunate coordination failure would be prevented by a ban on
technological tying.
The simple vertical diﬀerentiation model does not admit pure strategy equilibria in which
both firms invest in product improvement. We plan in future work to allow for systems
that are both vertically and horizontally product diﬀerentiated, so that some consumers
prefer the system sold by Firm 1 and others prefer Firm 2’s system, even when each has
the same (vertical) quality and is sold at the same price. In this richer model, both firms
may have an incentive to improve their products in a pure strategy equilibrium, and the
ability of Firm 1 to technological tie might reduce Firm 2’s market share short of complete
foreclosure. The welfare eﬀects of technological tying are more subtle in this case.
Some brief lessons from our analysis are relevant for local telecommunications markets.
Competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) have complained about a lack of coopera-
tion from incumbents (ILECs) who are required by law to provide interconnection services.
CLECs also seek lower wholesale prices for these services. While the enforcement of inter-
connection requirements is in the hands of the Federal Communications Commission, the
wholesale prices of interconnection services typically are set by state regulators in arbitra-
tion proceedings. A perennial policy proposal is for “structural separation” that would
force an ILEC to form a separate wholesale services company operating separately from its
retail services company. The idea is that structural separation would prevent technologi-
cal tying by making interconnection requirements more transparent and easier to enforce.
Our analysis suggests two points about the structural separations policy debate. First,
structural separation that prevents technological tying may fail to improve social welfare if
participants in the local services market coordinate on product improvement strategies that
form a mixed strategy or ineﬃcient pure strategy equilibrium. Second, a higher wholesale
price may improve an ILEC’s incentive to cooperate in the provision of interconnection
services and avoid unwanted equilibria in the product improvement game played by the
ILECs.21
21Our model assumes that retail prices are not regulated. In local telecommunications market, local
exchange service is regulated by state authorities, although ”vertical services” (e.g. voice mail) are not
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Appendix
A.1 Proof that in a mixed strategy equilibrium, at least one firm’s strategy
must have a discrete component
Let Si denote the support of Firm i’s mixed strategy, and define zi = inf Si. We prove
by contradiction that either z1 is a discrete element of S1, or z2 is a discrete element of S2.
Let Si denote the support and Ψi the c.d.f. of Firm i’s mixed strategy for i = 1, 2. The
assumption (A1) that r (z) is convex increasing requires that the Si are bounded. Define
the maximal investment levels z¯i = supSi. Obviously we must have Ψi (z¯i) = 1. Given






(z1 − Γ−max{z2, w − γ2}) dΨ2 (z2)
#
− r (z1) ,




(z2 + Γ−max{z1, w − γ1})dΨ1 (z1)− r (z2) .
Suppose that both firms’ strategies are continuous over a region that includes the upper
bounds of S1 and S2. Thus [z0, z¯1] ⊆ S1 and [z00, z¯2] ⊆ S2 for z0 < z¯1 and z00 < z¯2. Firm
1’s indiﬀerence condition, π1 (z1) = π1 (z¯1) for all z1 ∈ S1, requires Ψ2(z¯2) = r
0(z¯2+Γ)
M for
z2 ∈ [z0 − Γ, z¯1 − Γ) ⊂ S2. Therefore, z¯1 − Γ ≤ z¯2. Similarly, Firm 2’s indiﬀerence
condition, π2 (z2) = π2 (z¯2) for all z2 ∈ S2, requires Ψ1(z¯1) = r
0(z¯1−Γ)
M for z1 ∈ [z00 + Γ,
z¯2 + Γ) ⊂ S1. Therefore, z¯1 − Γ = z¯2. Furthermore, Ψ1(z¯1) = Ψ1(z¯2 + Γ) ≥ r
0(z¯2)
M and
Ψ2(z¯2) = Ψ2(z¯1 − Γ) ≥ r
0(z¯1)
M .
It must also be that z¯1 = z¯2 + Γ = zM . Clearly, z¯1 ≥ zM ; otherwise, Firm 1 could




M = 1 implies z¯1 = z
M .
Finally z¯2 = zM − Γ implies that Firm 2 could increase its profit by choosing z2 = zM .
This contradicts the definition of equilibrium. Therefore, either z¯1 is a discrete element of
S1 or z¯2 is a discrete element of S2.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 6: Mixed strategy equilibrium of the product im-
provement game.
In the assumed equilibrium, Firm 1 randomizes between zH1 and 0 and Firm 2 randomizes
between zM and zL2 , with z
M ≥ zH1 − Γ > zL2 > 0.
Necessity: In the candidate mixed strategy equilibrium, Firm 1 must be indiﬀerent
between investing zH1 and investing zero. This requires
(1− β)[γ1 + zH1 −max(γ2 + zL2 −w, 0)]M + βwM − r(zH1 ) = wM
Local optimality requires
(1− β)M = r0(zH1 ).
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If w > zL2 + γ2, then optimality and indiﬀerence for Firm 1 require
r0(zH1 )[z
H
1 + γ1] = r(z
H
1 ),




1 − zL2 − Γ) = r(zH1 ).
Similarly, Firm 2 must be indiﬀerent between investing zM and zL2 . This requires
(1− α)[γ2 + zM −max(γ1 −w, 0)−w]M + α[γ2 + zM
−max(γ1 + zH1 −w, 0)−w]M − r(zM)
= (1− α)[γ2 + zL2 −max(γ1 −w, 0)−w]M − r(zL2 ).
Local optimality requires
(1− α)M = r0(zL2 ).
If w ≤ zL2 + γ2 < zH1 + γ1, indiﬀerence and local optimality for Firm 2 requires
r0(zL2 )(z
L
2 + Γ− zH1 ) = r(zL2 ) + (zM − zH1 )M + (ΓM − r(zM)).
Therefore equations (2)-(6) in Proposition 6 are necessary for the mixed strategy equilib-
rium. Note that the left-hand side of the equation above is negative and the first two terms
on the right are positive. Therefore, ΓM < r(zM) is also necessary.
Suﬃciency: Firm 1 would not deviate from the assumed equilibrium by investing
0 < z1 < z
L
2 + Γ, because it would have no sales. For z
L
2 + Γ ≤ z1 < zM + Γ, Firm 1 wins
the market with probability 1−β and, by convexity, z1 6= zH1 is not profitable in this interval.
If Firm 1 invests z1 ≥ zM+Γ, it earns no more than r0(zH1 )(zM−zL2 )−r(zM+Γ)+wM. This
is less than r0(zH1 )(zH1 −zL2 −Γ)−r(zH1 )+wM, its payoﬀ when it invests zH1 . Hence Firm 1
would not deviate from the assumed equilibrium. Firm 2 could deviate by not investing.
This is unprofitable if (1−α)(zL2 +Γ)M −r(zL2 ) > (1−α)ΓM, or if r0(zL2 )zL2 > r(zL2 ), which
is true by convexity. Finally, Equation (3) directly implies zH1 > z
L
2 + Γ, while equation
(4) and the convexity of r(·) imply zM > zH1 −Γ. Therefore equations (2)-(6) are suﬃcient
for the mixed strategy equilibrium.





0(z1)− r(z1)]− Γ ≡ ω(z1)
with the properties ω(0) → −Γ, ω0(z1) = r
00(z1)r(z1)
r0(z1)2 ≥ 0 for z1 > 0, ω(zM) = π
M
M − Γ, and
limΓ→0 ω(z1) > 0 for z1 ∈ (0, zM ]. Equation (4) implicitly defines
z1 =
πM − [r0(z2)z2 − r(z2)]
M − r0(z2) + Γ ≡ ϕ(z2)
with the properties ϕ(0) = π
M
M + Γ, ϕ
0(z2) = r
00(z2)[πM−(z2M−r(z2)]
[M−r0(z2)]2 > 0, and ϕ(z2)→ zM +Γ
as z2 → zM . Now define zˆ1 by ω(zˆ1) = 0 and z˜2 by ϕ(z˜2) = zM . Suﬃcient conditions for
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a solution (zH1 , z
L
2 ) ∈ (0, zM)2 are zˆ1 < π
M
M + Γ and z˜2 >
πM
M − Γ. (See Figure 3, which
shows a fixed point of ω(z1) and ϕ(z2)). By continuity, if Γ is suﬃciently small, then
ω(π
M
M +Γ) > 0. Furthermore, ω(Γ) < 0. These inequalities imply zˆ1 <
πM
M +Γ. Note that
z˜2 → zM as Γ→ 0. Thus z˜2 > πMM − Γ if Γ is suﬃciently small.
A.3 Mixed strategy equilibrium of the product improvement game with quadratic
R&D costs.
Assume R&D costs are quadratic, r(z) = 12kz
2, and let m ≡ M/k. In the assumed
equilibrium, Firm 1 randomizes between zM and zL1 and Firm 2 randomizes between z
H
2
and zero, with zM > zH2 + Γ > z
L
1 ≥ 0. Furthermore, equilibrium requires zL1 > Γ if
w < γ2. A mixed strategy equilibrium cannot exist if w ≥ γ2 + zH2 , because then Firm 2
would not invest. Therefore, without loss of generality we assume w < γ2+ z
H
2 . There are
two cases to consider, corresponding to w ≤ γ1 + zL1 and w > γ1 + zL1 .
Case (i): w ≤ γ1 + zL1 .
Necessity: In the candidate mixed strategy equilibrium, Firm 2 must be indiﬀerent
between investing zH2 and investing zero. The indiﬀerence condition for Firm 2 is
π2(z
H
2 ) = (1− α)(γ2 + zH2 −max(γ1 + zL1 −w, 0)−w)M − r(zH2 )
= (1− α)(zH2 − zL1 + Γ)M − r(zH2 ) = 0.
Local optimality of zH2 requires:
r0(zH2 ) = (1− α)M. (9)
Equation (9) gives for quadratic R&D costs
zH2 = 2(z
L
1 − Γ). (10)
Similarly, assuming zL1 > Γ, the indiﬀerence condition for Firm 1 is
π1(z
L
1 ) = (1− β)(γ1 + zL1 −max(γ2 −w, 0))M + βwM − r(zL1 ) =
π1(z
M) = (1− β)(γ1 + zM −max(γ2 −w, 0))M + β(γ1 + zM −max(γ2 + zH2 −w, 0))M − r(zM)
or
(1− β)zL1M − r(zL1 ) = πM − β(zH2 + Γ)M.
The local optimality condition is
r0(zL1 ) = (1− β)M. (11)




(m+ zL1 )− Γ. (12)
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Equilibrium also requires m > zH2 + Γ, or m > Γ. This condition also implies z
H
2 + Γ >
zL1 > Γ. Note that w ≤ γ1+zL1 requires w < γ1+ 13(m+2Γ). The investment probabilities
(α,β) follow directly from the local optimality conditions (9) and (11).
Suﬃciency: If Firm 2 deviates from the assumed equilibrium and invests zM , it would
earn (1 − α)(zM + Γ − zL1 )M + αΓM − r(zM), which cannot dominate Firm 2’s profit at
z2 = 0. This requires
r(zM) > r0(zH2 )(z
M − zL1 ) +MΓ
or, for the case of quadratic R&D costs, Γ < 14m.
Firm 1 could deviate from the assumed equilibrium by investing z1 < zL1 , which also
must be unprofitable. If z1 ≥ Γ, this requires π1(z) = (1−β)(γ1+ z−max(γ2−w, 0))M +
βwM − r(z) ≤ (1 − β)(γ1 + zL1 −max(γ2 − w, 0))M + βwM − r(zL1 ) for z < zL1 . This is
satisfied because(1− β)zM − r(z) > 0 is increasing in z for z < zL1 . If z1 < Γ, then Firm 1
would make no sales and have no incentive to invest unless Firm 2 is foreclosed by w. The
assumption that w ≤ γ1 + zL1 implies that w < γ2. Hence the corresponding condition is
wM ≤ (1− β)(zL1 − Γ+ w)M + βwM − r(zL1 ) for z < zL1 . For quadratic R&D costs, this
is satisfied if Γ < 14m.
Finally, the firms have no incentives to deviate from prescribed strategies. By construc-
tion, Firm 2 is indiﬀerent between investments zH2 and 0, and Firm 1 is indiﬀerent between
zM and zL1 . And we have already argued that Firm 1 has no incentive to deviate to 0 and
Firm 2 has no incentive to deviate to zM . Other possible deviations are unprofitable by the
concavity of profit functions over relevant ranges. Hence, we conclude that the assumed
equilibrium exists in case (i) if Γ < 14m and w < γ1 +
1
3(m+ 2Γ).
Case (ii): w > γ1 + z
L
1 .
Necessity: The assumed equilibrium cannot exist if γ1 + z
L
1 < w < γ2, because Firm 2
would win the market when Firm 1 invests zL1 , so Firm 1 would not invest. Suppose instead
that w ≥ γ2. Then Firm 2 is foreclosed if it does not invest, even if 0 ≤ zL1 ≤ Γ. The
indiﬀerence condition for Firm 2 is
π2(z
H
2 ) = (1− α)(γ2 + zH2 −max(γ1 + zL1 −w, 0)−w)M − r(zH2 )
= (1− α)(γ2 + zH2 −w)M − r(zH2 ) = 0.
Using local optimality of zH2 (equation (9)) and assuming quadratic costs gives
zH2 = 2(w − γ2). (13)
The indiﬀerence condition for Firm 1 is π1(zL1 ) = π1(z
M),or
(1− β)(γ1 + zL1 )M + βwM − r(zL1 )
= (1− β)(γ1 + zM)M + β(zM − Γ− zH2 +w)M − r(zM).
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and substituting (13) gives
zL1 = 2(2w − (γ1 + γ2))−m. (14)
The assumption that w > γ1+z
L
1 along with equation (14), z
L








This in turn implies that a necessary condition for equilibrium is m > Γ. This also implies
w < γ1 + z
M .
Suﬃciency: As in case (i), Firm 1 would not profit by deviating to 0 and has no
incentive to invest at levels other than zL1 or z
M . If Firm 2 deviates by investing zM , it
would earn
π2(z
M) = (1− α)(γ2 + zM −w)M + α(γ2 + zM −max(γ1 + zM −w, 0)−w)M − r(zM)
= πM − (1− α)(w− γ2)M − α(zM − Γ)M,
which has to be less than the zero payoﬀ when it does not invest. Substituting the local
optimality condition (9) and assuming quadratic R&D costs, this requires
πM − r0(zH2 )(w − γ2)− (M − r0(zH2 ))(zM − Γ) ≤ 0.
For the case of quadratic R&D, using (13), suﬃciency requires
(w − γ2)2 − (w − γ2)(m− Γ) +
1
4
m(m− 2Γ) ≥ 0.
This, in turn, implies either w ≤ γ1+ 12m or w ≥ γ2+ 12m. However, the necessary conditions
for an equilibrium require max[γ2, γ1 +
1
4(m + 2Γ)] < w < γ1 +
1
3(m + 2Γ). Notice that
w < γ1+
1












No equilibrium exists when w ≥ γ2 if m < 2Γ. Furthermore, γ2 ≥ γ1 + 14(m+ 2Γ) when
m ≥ 2Γ. Thus equilibrium requires







and m ≥ 2Γ. As Γ→ 0, this condition becomes





The equilibrium exists for an intermediate range of w if Γ is suﬃciently small.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 8: Mixed strategy equilibrium of the technological
tying game.
Consider a candidate mixed strategy equilibrium with zH1 = z





0. Assume γ1 + z
M > w ≥ w¯ − Γ ≥ γ2. A mixed strategy equilibrium of the tying game
does not exist if w < w¯ − Γ or if w > γ1 + zM . In the former case, Firm 1 will always
foreclose. In the latter case, Firm 1 would always prefer to sell the component. Define
π(z) = r0(z)z − r(z). Suppose Firm 1 invests zH1 = zM . The component price would
foreclose Firm 2 if it does not invest because w ≥ γ2. If it does invest, Firm 1 would impose
a tie because γ1 + z
M > w. Thus, when Firm 1 invests zM , it earns
π1(z
M) = γ1M + π
M .
Suppose Firm 1 invests zL1 . As before, the component price forecloses Firm 2 if it does not
invest. If Firm 2 invests, then Firm 1 would not foreclose if γ1 + z
L
1 < w. Then
π1(z
L
1 ) = βwM + (1− β)(γ1 + zL1 )M − r(zL1 ).
A mixed strategy equilibrium requires
r0(zL1 ) = (1− β)M
and
(M − r0(zL1 ))(w − γ1) = πM − π(zL1 ).
Define
ψ(z) = (M − r0(z))(w − γ1)− πM + π(z).
A necessary condition for a mixed strategy equilibrium is ψ(zL1 ) = 0. At z = 0, ψ(0) =
M(w − γ1)− πM ≥ 0 if and only if w ≥ w¯− Γ, and ψ(zM) = 0. Note that
ψ0(z) = (z − (w − γ1))r00(z)
and ψ0(z) has the same sign as (z − w + γ1). Furthermore, ψ0(zM) > 0 if and only if
w < γ1+ z
M and ψ0(0) < 0 if and only if w > γ1. Therefore, if w¯−Γ ≤ w < γ1+ zM , then
there exists zM > zL1 ≥ 0 such that ψ(zL1 ) = 0. (See Figure 4.) Moreover, as necessary,
zL1 < w− γ1.
Firm 2 earns a profit only if it invests z2 = zH2 and if z1 = z
L
1 and w ≤ γ2 + zH2 . Then
π2(z
H
2 ) = (1− α)[γ2 + zH2 −w]M − r(zH2 )
Local optimality requires r0(zH2 ) = (1− α)M. Thus we can write
π2(z
H
2 ) = π(z
H
2 ) + r
0(zH2 )(γ2 −w).





φ(z) = π(z) + r0(z)(γ2 −w).
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Note that
φ0(z) = (z − (w − γ2))r00(z)
and φ0(z) has the same sign as (z − w + γ2). Therefore, if φ(0) ≤ 0 and φ(zM − Γ) > 0,
then there exists a zH2 < z
M − Γ such that φ(zH2 ) = 0 and zH2 > w − γ2. (See Figure 5.)
Now φ(0) ≤ 0 if w > γ2. Assume zM > Γ. Then φ(zM −Γ) = r0(zM −Γ)(zM + γ1−w)−
r(zM − Γ) ≥ 0 if and only if w ≤ γ1 + zM − r(z
M−Γ)
r0(zM−Γ) . Furthermore, z
H
2 > w − γ2, hence
zH2 + Γ > w− γ1 > zL1 .
Summarizing, Proposition 8 provides a statement of the necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions for existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium of the tying game with zH1 = z
M >








m ≡M/k. Then ψ(zL1 ) = 0 implies
zL1 = 2(w − γ1)−m,
and φ(zH2 ) = 0 implies
zH2 = 2(w − γ2).
A mixed strategy equilibrium exists with zH1 = z




2 = 0 if
w¯ − Γ ≤ w < w¯− 1
2
Γ,




Figure 1.  Firm 1 profit in pure strategy equilibria 
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Figure 2.  Expected welfare with pure 
and mixed strategy equilibria
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